Lpg Spheres Failures

Airfresh Society: Domino Gas BLEVE Disaster หายนะโรงก๊าซ ใน ...

In San Juanico, Mexico (outside of Mexico City, Mexico) on November 19, 1984. The explosions consumed 11,000 cu. meters of gas, representing one third of Mexico City's entire liquid petroleum gas supply. The explosions destroyed the facility and devastated the local town of San Juan Ixhuatepec, with 500–600 people killed, and 5000–7000 others suffering severe burns. The incident took place at a storage and distribution facility (a "terminal") for liquid petroleum gas (LPG) belonging to the multi-state enterprise, Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX). The facility consisted of 54 LPG storage tanks; 6 large spherical tanks (four holding 1,600 m3 and two holding 2,400 m3) and 48 smaller horizontal bullet shaped tanks of various sizes. All together the tanks contained 11,000 m3 of a propane/butane mixture at the time of the accident. At 5:40 a.m., the cloud reached the flare and ignited, resulting in a vapor cloud explosion that severely damaged the tank farm and resulted in a massive conflagration fed by the LPG leaking from newly damaged tanks. Just four minutes later, at 5:44 a.m., the first tank underwent a BLEVE (Boiling Liquid/Expanding Vapor Explosion). Over the next hour, 12 separate BLEVE explosions were recorded, the two largest (from the 2,400 m3 spherical tanks) being so large as to register a 5.0 seismic reading on the Richter Scale. The fire and smaller explosions continued until 10 a.m. the next morning. The town of San Juan Ixhuatepec surrounded the facility and consisted of 40,000 residents, with an additional 60,000 more living in the hills. The explosions demolished houses and propelled twisted metal fragments (some measuring 30 tons) over distances ranging from a few meters to up to 1200 m. Much of the town was destroyed by the explosions and ensuing fire, with the current statistics indicating 500 to 600 deaths, and 5,000–7,000 severe injuries. Radiant heat generated by the inferno completely incinerated most corpses completely to ashes, with only 2% of the recovered remains left in recognizable condition. of Hellenic Petroleum refinery at Aspropyrgos, in accordance with the new SEVESO II Directive requirements. The analysis involves a systematic procedure for the evaluation of potential domino accident scenarios, based on a set of damage-to- equipment criteria. The results show that the main concern is for a potential BLEVE accident in the nearby LPG handling establishment, which could result to a BLEVE accident in the refinery LPG installation. LPG sphere and a truck loading station. Figure 1 shows the layout of the installation, which is located across the southern fence of the refinery establishment. Nearby installations include refinery process units, oil storage tanks, an oil truck loading station, and an LPG handling terminal. The latter establishment includes eight cylindrical LPG storage tanks, This Study, performed in accordance to the SEVESO II requirements, examines domino accident scenarios that result from failures in nearby installations and could have an impact to the refinery LPG installation. This is particularly important with respect to the identification of external hazard sources for the facility [2]. In addition, the study examines domino accident scenarios that result from failures in the refinery can cause severe damage to nearby process equipment, and thus may initiate a secondary accident. The extent of the damage depends on radiation or overpressure intensity, the duration of exposure, the type of material, the presence of protection (e.g. water deluge) systems, etc. Practical ‘rules of thumb” found in literature, provide values of of damage. AIChE considers heat flux of 37.5 kW/m2 as the limit for severe damage to process equipment [3], while TNO identifies critical radiation intensities of 100 kW/m2 and 25 kW/m2, for rupture and deformation of structural elements, respectively [4]. In both cases, the duration of exposure is considered to be of the order of 15 - 20 minutes. Concerning explosion consequences, TNO suggests that overpressures of of releases into containment dikes, or unconfined, e.g. in case of releases from LPG or gasoline road tankers. For modelling purposes, tank fires, e.g. fire in a crude tank following failure of floating roof, are considered as confined pool fires. Radiation levels are generally moderate, e.g. for an LPG pool fire the radiation at the surface of the flame is about 100 kW/m2 Vapour cloud fire and explosion. Release and dispersion of LPG, if ignited, could lead to a flash fire burning that part of vapour cloud within the flammability limits. Within the burning cloud, there may be ignition of equipment, but due to the short duration of the phenomenon, the risk for domino effects is small. If however, there is sufficient mass within the cloud (e.g.

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